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Optical Models of Consciousness
Imants Barušs
In the late 1970s there was enthusiasm over Pribram's holographic model and Bohm's
notion of implication. These theories were thought to explain consciousness, the nature of
reality and mystical experiences in one fell swoop and to show that science had, at last,
accepted spiritual events into its fold. This last sentiment was echoed by Wilber:
Agree or disagree with the new paradigm(s), one conclusion unmistakably
emerges: at most, the new science demands spirit; at least, it makes ample room
for spirit. Either way, modern science is no longer denying spirit. And that, that
is epochal. As Hans Kung remarked, the standard answer to "Do you believe in
Spirit?" used to be, "Of course not, I'm a scientist," but it might very soon
become, "Of course I believe in Spirit. I'm a scientist." (1982, p.4)
However, science is far from being homogeneous with regard to the beliefs held by its
practitioners and there does not appear to be any acceptance of transcendentalism within
science as a whole.
Optical models arose from two separate considerations. Pribram, a neuroscientist, had
tried to understand the encoding of information in the brain (Ferguson, 1982b) while the
physicist Bohm was trying to understand the nature of physical reality from the point of view
of quantum mechanics (Bohm, 1980). The confluence of these streams led to a model of
human consciousness that was a radical departure from accepted ideas about reality. Pribram
has admitted that this model is a stab in the dark (Ferguson, 1982b).
This paper starts by describing holography, then the relationship of holography to brain
functioning and then, problems with the holographic model. Bohm's notions of wholeness
and implication are introduced and, finally, Bohm's understanding of the role of
consciousness in his theory are discussed. This paper is not meant to be comprehensive, but
is rather to provide a summary of the optical theory.
Holography
The hologram was invented in 1965 by Leith and Upatnieks using the theoretical
information provided by Gabor in 1947 (Ferguson, 1982a). It is a means of lensless
photography that employs lasers to produce a three dimensional image. To photograph an
object, a laserbeam is split, so that half of it passes through a half-silvered mirror before
striking the photographic plate and the other half is reflected and strikes an object before
striking the same photographic plate. Because a laser is a coherent light beam, meaning that
the light waves are all in phase, the half of the beam that is scattered from the object is put
out of phase and interferes with the straight-through beam resulting in an interference pattern
on the photographic plate (Briggs & Peat, 1984; Ferguson, 1982a). 
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When the photographic plate is illuminated using a laser beam, a three-dimensional
image appears to an observer standing within a small range of angles in the direction of
illumination. If any part of the photographic plate is destroyed, the image that appears upon
illumination is still an image of the entire object, although lacking in detail. This is due to the
fact that information about the whole object is encoded in every part of the interference
pattern on the photographic plate (Briggs & Peat, 1984; Ferguson, 1982a).
The process of encoding the information about an object, i.e., of photographing it, can
be described mathematically by the use of Fourier transformations. Similarly, Fourier
transformations describe the way in which an image is reconstructed from the photographic
plate upon illumination (Briggs & Peat, 1984; Ferguson, 1982a).
Holography in the Brain
The hologram has certain properties that are similar to the properties of memory. Just
as large parts of a holographic plate can be destroyed without losing the capacity to produce
an entire image, so large parts of the brain can be destroyed without interfering with the recall
of a specific memory (Briggs & Peat, 1984; Pribram, 1980; 1982). It was this observation that
led Pribram to consider the holograph as a model of human mental functioning (Briggs &
Peat, 1984; Pribram, 1982). 
Pribram made the observation that there are horizontal networks of nerve cells in the
nervous system that appear to modulate the information relayed in the major sensory
pathways. It is this horizontal network of cells that realizes a Fourier transformation of
incoming sensory information, so that it, in fact, becomes encoded in the brain as an
interference pattern, analogous to that produced on a photographic plate in the case of
holography. 
Some neurons, now called local circuit neurons, have no long fibers and display
no nerve impulses. They function in the graded wave mode primarily and are
especially responsible for horizontal connectivities in sheets of neural tissue,
connectivities in which holographic-like interference patterns can become
constructed. (Pribram, 1982, p. 32)
There are, for example, horizontal and amacrine cells in the eye which are local circuit
neurons (Bailey, 1981) and which could begin the Fourier transformation of incoming visual
information.
If the brain is the equivalent of a photographic plate with encoded interference patterns,
then "illumination" of the brain, applying a Fourier transformation to the encoded material,
could explain the presence of mental imagery (Pribram, 1980). Going one step further and
using the fact that a holographic image is three-dimensional, Pribram has postulated that, in
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fact, the real world itself, is only a holographic image, that appears three-dimensional to us
(Pribram, 1982). In both cases, however, the question arises, of what it is that illuminates the
interference pattern in the brain, and for whom this illumination takes place. Pribram has
suggested that perhaps the physiological cybernetic systems of the brain which are implicated
in "selective attention, intentional behavior, and the ability to make discriminative and
delayed responses" (Pribram, 1980, p. 58) serve this function. However, such an explanation
does not adequately account for the sense of a self as observer of images. 
Implication
Holography is an example of a more general phenomenon described by Bohm. To
understand it, consider the following example. Suppose one were to take a piece of paper and
fold it a number of times. While it is folded up, one takes a pair of scissors and cuts off a
corner. At this point, Bohm would maintain that one is in the implicate order. In unfolding
the paper, one would be moving from the implicate order to the explicate order, and the
single cut in the folded paper would now correspond to a pattern of holes in the paper (Factor,
1985). The implicate order is a domain in which the diversity of physical and mental reality
is enfolded so as to produce a whole. 
In terms of the implicate order one may say that everything is enfolded into
everything. This contrasts with the explicate order now dominant in physics in
which things are unfolded in the sense that each thing lies only in its own
particular region of space (and time) and outside the regions belonging to other
things. (Bohm, 1980, p. 177) 
Hence the physical world, and the three-dimensional images that result from illumination in
holography, are analogous to the explicate order; the interference pattern on a holographic
plate corresponds to the implicate order. 
Implication and Consciousness
Bohm used the term "consciousness" to refer to "thought, feeling, desire, will, impulse
to act and an unspecified set of further features, such as awareness" (Factor, 1985, p. 15). As
mentioned before, he thought that physical reality and cognition are explications of an
implicate order. 
Matter as a whole can be understood in terms of the notion that the implicate
order is the immediate and primary actuality (while the explicate order can be
derived as a particular, distinguished case of the implicate order). The question
that arises here, then, is that of whether or not (as was in a certain sense
anticipated by Descartes) the actual 'substance' of consciousness can be
understood in terms of the notion that the implicate order is also its primary and
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immediate actuality. If matter and consciousness could in this way be understood
together, in terms of the same general notion of order, the way would be opened
to comprehending their relationship on the basis of some common ground. Thus
we could come to the germ of a new notion of unbroken wholeness, in which
consciousness is no longer to be fundamentally separated from matter. (Bohm,
1980, p. 197)
To make his point, however, Bohm brought in arguments from his own introspected
experience which are highly suspect. Nonetheless, the idea remains that that which we are
conscious of, that which constitutes our conscious experience, is the unfoldment of patterns
in the implicate domain (Briggs & Peat, 1984,; Factor, 1985). 
There is a second use that Bohm makes of the implication/explication model with
regard to conscious experience. He maintains that conscious experience itself enfolds a
wealth of information that is available upon explication. Any conscious experience
presupposes, for example, one's remembered past, certain information about world conditions
and various rational and imaginal consequences (Factor, 1985). 
Conclusions
All of this is far from the usual understanding of reality, and opens the door for the
explanation of mystical experiences. The claim is made that a mystical experience may be
the way in which one's direct participation in the implicate order becomes described
(Ferguson, 1982b). Even more radical conjectures involve the possibility that conscious
functioning at the level of the implicate order gives rise to all of physical reality as a
reflection of its own functioning (Briggs & Peat, 1984,; Ferguson, 1982b).
This brings us back to the point at which we began. There is scope for the use of one's
imagination in the optical models, but I would need to see the details of these models, which
I have yet to see published, in order to assess their validity.
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